Intel® Arria® 10 Hard Processor System Technical Reference Manual

ID 683711
Date 8/28/2023
Public
Document Table of Contents

7.1.3.8. Anti-Tamper

The Security Manager receives a tamper detection signal when a tamper event is detected in the device.

Anti-tamper logic can be implemented in the FPGA soft logic to detect a tamper event. No tamper detection is available until the FPGA is configured. The user must define the anti-tamper design. Some examples of tamper detection that could be implemented are:

  • Using the FPGA voltage sensor to detect any IR drops across the device.
  • Using an A/D controller to detect temperature changes in the device due to tamper.
  • Assigning loaner I/O as dedicated tamper pins to detect package break-away.

The tamper detection signal sent to the Security Manager, anti_tamper_in, is an active low signal. When there is no tamper event, it is driven to 1. The Security Manager also provides a tamper acknowledge signal to the FPGA interface. The tamper event input to the HPS is gated with a signal indicating the completion of FPGA configuration. This prevents an inadvertent tamper event assertion or tamper response from the HPS to the rest of the system.

When the Security Manager receives a tamper detection assertion, it prepares the system to go into reset and notifies the Reset Manager of the event. When the Reset Manager receives the tamper event assertion from the Security Manager, it drives all the peripherals and MPU into reset. It asserts a request and enables all peripherals memories to initiate a memory scramble and a memory clear, either in series or parallel, depending on the information sent from the Security Manager. The memory clearing includes the on-chip RAM, L1 caches, and L2 cache and RAM for the peripherals listed below:
  • Ethernet MAC 0/1/2
  • USB OTG 0/1
  • QSPI flash controller
  • NAND flash controller
  • SD/MMC controller
  • DMA controller
Once the memory scramble and clear completes, each module sends an acknowledgment back to the Reset Manager.

Upon completion of memory scrambling of all IPs, the Security Manager sends a response to the FPGA indicating that a tamper event has been handled in the HPS. This response is followed by HPS entering into a cold reset without exiting until another power cycle occurs. Both Security Manager and Reset Manager enter reset. Other resets, such as warm reset or cold reset, do not affect the state of the Security Manager or the Reset Manager.

If the FPGA POR is de-asserted while the HPS is in a tamper event reset, then the Security Manager goes back to the reset state.