Symmetric Cryptographic Intel FPGA Hard IP User Guide

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ID 714305
Date 10/02/2023
Public
Document Table of Contents
Document Table of Contents x
1. Introduction 2. Interface Overview 3. Parameters 4. Designing with the IP Core 5. Block Description 6. Cryptographic IP Data Profiles 7. Configuration Registers 8. Design Example 9. Symmetric Cryptographic Intel FPGA Hard IP User Guide Archives 10. Document Revision History for the Symmetric Cryptographic Intel FPGA Hard IP User Guide
1. Introduction x
1.1. Terminology 1.2. IP Core Overview 1.3. Release Information 1.4. Device Family Support 1.5. Resource Utilization
1.2. IP Core Overview x
1.2.1. IP Core Applications
2. Interface Overview x
2.1. Clock Signals 2.2. Reset Signals 2.3. AXI-ST Interface 2.4. AXI-Lite Interface
4. Designing with the IP Core x
4.1. Installing and Licensing Intel® FPGA IP Cores 4.2. Specifying the IP Core Parameters and Options 4.3. Generated File Structure 4.4. Symmetric Cryptographic IP Core Flow 4.5. Dynamically Disabling SM4 Capability 4.6. Error Handling 4.7. Error Reporting 4.8. Resetting the IP Core 4.9. Channel Definition and Allocation 4.10. Byte Ordering 4.11. AXI-ST Single Packet Mode 4.12. AXI-ST Multiple Packet Mode
4.1. Installing and Licensing Intel® FPGA IP Cores x
4.1.1. Intel® FPGA IP Evaluation Mode
4.6. Error Handling x
4.6.1. Detected Error Handling 4.6.2. Key RAM ECC Error Handling
5. Block Description x
5.1. Reset Sequencer 5.2. AXI-ST Ready Latency 5.3. AXI Adapter 5.4. Integrity Check Value Comparison 5.5. GCM Padding and Depadding
5.3. AXI Adapter x
5.3.1. MAC Packing 5.3.2. Data Last Indicator 5.3.3. Stream and Channel ID Buffering 5.3.4. TKEEP and LAST_SEGMENT Signals Generation 5.3.5. MAC Dropping on Decryption
5.5. GCM Padding and Depadding x
5.5.1. GCM Padding 5.5.2. GCM Depadding
6. Cryptographic IP Data Profiles x
6.1. MAC Security Profile (MACsec) 6.2. IP Security Profile (IPsec) 6.3. Generic GCM Profile (GCM) 6.4. Generic XTS Profile (XTS)
6.1. MAC Security Profile (MACsec) x
6.1.1. MACsec Flow 6.1.2. AXI-ST Interface Using MAC Security (MACsec) Profile Pattern
6.2. IP Security Profile (IPsec) x
6.2.1. AXI-ST Interface Using IP Security (IPsec) Profile Pattern
6.3. Generic GCM Profile (GCM) x
6.3.1. AXI- ST Interface Using Generic GCM Profile Pattern
6.4. Generic XTS Profile (XTS) x
6.4.1. AXI-ST Interface Using Generic XTS Profile Pattern
8. Design Example x
8.1. Functional Description 8.2. Crypto VSIP Top Block Descriptions 8.3. Test Configurations 8.4. Software Requirements 8.5. Simulation Requirements 8.6. Steps to Generate the Design Example 8.7. Running Simulation Tests 8.8. Running Hardware Tests
8.2. Crypto VSIP Top Block Descriptions x
8.2.1. Clock and Reset 8.2.2. Host Interface
8.7. Running Simulation Tests x
8.7.1. Steps to Simulate the Design Example
8.8. Running Hardware Tests x
8.8.1. Supported Boards 8.8.2. Steps to Compile the Design Example for Hardware 8.8.3. Steps to Run the Design Example on Hardware
1. Introduction
2. Interface Overview
3. Parameters
4. Designing with the IP Core
5. Block Description
6. Cryptographic IP Data Profiles
7. Configuration Registers
8. Design Example
9. Symmetric Cryptographic Intel FPGA Hard IP User Guide Archives
10. Document Revision History for the Symmetric Cryptographic Intel FPGA Hard IP User Guide

5.3.5. MAC Dropping on Decryption

The Symmetric Cryptographic IP core support a feature to drop the 16 byte MAC tag on decryption request. The feature is available for MACsec only.

To enable this feature, set the decrypt_drop_mac_en parameter to 1. This feature is independent to ICV comparison feature where the ICV comparison result sent out to user is unaffected by this feature.

Table 31.  Egress Packet Example Exiting the AES/SM4 Inline Cryptographic Accelerator This table illustrates the Egress packet exiting the AES/SM4 Inline Cryptographic Accelerator with 16 byte MAC located at different 128 bits segment within the cycle. All the AXI-ST control signals such as tlast, tkeep, tuser_last_segment<N> are updated to reference the last byte of the payload and not the last byte of MAC.
Profile MACsec MACsec   MACsec   MACsec   MACsec
MAC_IV_tweak_en 0 1   1   1   1
data_en 1 0   1   1   1
next_packet_en 0 1   1   1   0
tlast 0 1   1   1   1
num_empty_bytes 0 64   48 to 63   32 to 63   16 to 63
DATA
data[127:0] AAD/Text MAC   AAD/Text   AAD/Text   AAD/Text
data[255:128] AAD/Text AAD/Text   MAC   AAD/Text   AAD/Text
data[391:256] AAD/Text AAD/Text   AAD/Text   MAC   AAD/Text
data[511:392] AAD/Text AAD/Text   AAD/Text   AAD/Text   MAC
Table 32.  Egress Packet Example within the Symmetric Cryptographic IP core This table illustrates the Symmetric Cryptographic IP core discarding the 16 byte MAC. All the AXI-ST control signals such as tlast, tkeep, tuser_last_segment<N> are updated to reference the last byte of the payload and not the last byte of MAC.
Profile MACsec MACsec   MACsec   MACsec   MACsec
tvalid 1 1   1   1   1
MAC_IV_tweak_en 0 1   1   1   1
data_en 1 0   1   1   1
next_packet_en 0 1   1   1   0
tlast 1 0   1   1   1
tkeep All 1's

1111_1111

1111_1111

1111_1111

1111_1111

1111_1111

1111_1111

0000_0000

0000_0000

  

1111_1111

1111_1111

1111_1111

1111_1111

0000_0000

0000_0000

1111_1111

1111_1111

  

1111_1111

1111_1111

0000_0000

0000_0000

1111_1111

1111_1111

1111_1111

1111_1111

  

0000_0000

0000_0000

1111_1111

1111_1111

1111_1111

1111_1111

1111_1111

1111_1111
tuser_last_segment0 0 0   1   0   0
tuser_last_segment1 0 0   0   1   0
tuser_last_segment2 0 0   0   0   1
tuser_last_segment3 1 0   0   0   0
DATA
data[127:0] AAD/Text IDLE   AAD/Text   AAD/Text   AAD/Text
data[255:128] AAD/Text AAD/Text   IDLE   AAD/Text   AAD/Text
data[391:256] AAD/Text AAD/Text   AAD/Text   IDLE   AAD/Text
data[511:392] AAD/Text AAD/Text   AAD/Text   AAD/Text   IDLE

If MAC is located in segment 0 and there is no subsequent packets in segment 1, 2, or 3, the tvalid signal deasserts since all segments are the IDLE bytes after the MAC dropping.

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