Symmetric Cryptographic Intel FPGA Hard IP User Guide

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ID 714305
Date 10/02/2023
Public
Document Table of Contents
Document Table of Contents x
1. Introduction 2. Interface Overview 3. Parameters 4. Designing with the IP Core 5. Block Description 6. Cryptographic IP Data Profiles 7. Configuration Registers 8. Design Example 9. Symmetric Cryptographic Intel FPGA Hard IP User Guide Archives 10. Document Revision History for the Symmetric Cryptographic Intel FPGA Hard IP User Guide
1. Introduction x
1.1. Terminology 1.2. IP Core Overview 1.3. Release Information 1.4. Device Family Support 1.5. Resource Utilization
1.2. IP Core Overview x
1.2.1. IP Core Applications
2. Interface Overview x
2.1. Clock Signals 2.2. Reset Signals 2.3. AXI-ST Interface 2.4. AXI-Lite Interface
4. Designing with the IP Core x
4.1. Installing and Licensing Intel® FPGA IP Cores 4.2. Specifying the IP Core Parameters and Options 4.3. Generated File Structure 4.4. Symmetric Cryptographic IP Core Flow 4.5. Dynamically Disabling SM4 Capability 4.6. Error Handling 4.7. Error Reporting 4.8. Resetting the IP Core 4.9. Channel Definition and Allocation 4.10. Byte Ordering 4.11. AXI-ST Single Packet Mode 4.12. AXI-ST Multiple Packet Mode
4.1. Installing and Licensing Intel® FPGA IP Cores x
4.1.1. Intel® FPGA IP Evaluation Mode
4.6. Error Handling x
4.6.1. Detected Error Handling 4.6.2. Key RAM ECC Error Handling
5. Block Description x
5.1. Reset Sequencer 5.2. AXI-ST Ready Latency 5.3. AXI Adapter 5.4. Integrity Check Value Comparison 5.5. GCM Padding and Depadding
5.3. AXI Adapter x
5.3.1. MAC Packing 5.3.2. Data Last Indicator 5.3.3. Stream and Channel ID Buffering 5.3.4. TKEEP and LAST_SEGMENT Signals Generation 5.3.5. MAC Dropping on Decryption
5.5. GCM Padding and Depadding x
5.5.1. GCM Padding 5.5.2. GCM Depadding
6. Cryptographic IP Data Profiles x
6.1. MAC Security Profile (MACsec) 6.2. IP Security Profile (IPsec) 6.3. Generic GCM Profile (GCM) 6.4. Generic XTS Profile (XTS)
6.1. MAC Security Profile (MACsec) x
6.1.1. MACsec Flow 6.1.2. AXI-ST Interface Using MAC Security (MACsec) Profile Pattern
6.2. IP Security Profile (IPsec) x
6.2.1. AXI-ST Interface Using IP Security (IPsec) Profile Pattern
6.3. Generic GCM Profile (GCM) x
6.3.1. AXI- ST Interface Using Generic GCM Profile Pattern
6.4. Generic XTS Profile (XTS) x
6.4.1. AXI-ST Interface Using Generic XTS Profile Pattern
8. Design Example x
8.1. Functional Description 8.2. Crypto VSIP Top Block Descriptions 8.3. Test Configurations 8.4. Software Requirements 8.5. Simulation Requirements 8.6. Steps to Generate the Design Example 8.7. Running Simulation Tests 8.8. Running Hardware Tests
8.2. Crypto VSIP Top Block Descriptions x
8.2.1. Clock and Reset 8.2.2. Host Interface
8.7. Running Simulation Tests x
8.7.1. Steps to Simulate the Design Example
8.8. Running Hardware Tests x
8.8.1. Supported Boards 8.8.2. Steps to Compile the Design Example for Hardware 8.8.3. Steps to Run the Design Example on Hardware
1. Introduction
2. Interface Overview
3. Parameters
4. Designing with the IP Core
5. Block Description
6. Cryptographic IP Data Profiles
7. Configuration Registers
8. Design Example
9. Symmetric Cryptographic Intel FPGA Hard IP User Guide Archives
10. Document Revision History for the Symmetric Cryptographic Intel FPGA Hard IP User Guide

5.5.2. GCM Depadding

This block implements the idle byte depadding to the AAD, Bypass, Text, and MAC fields which are 16 bytes aligned when "Enable Gen. GCM egress depadding" is selected in the IP GUI. You are required to send in the real AAD and Bypass field lengths, regardless of whether the GCM padding on ingress is enabled or disabled. When GCM padding on ingress is disabled, the AAD and Bypass fields are 16 byte-aligned, and the IP routes the real AAD and Bypass lengths to Crypto egress logic for depadding.

The egress decryption MAC is dropped if "Drop the MAC on applicable profile decryption" on the IP GUI is also checked.

When "Enable Gen. GCM egress depadding" is not selected in the IP GUI, the depadding logic within the IP is optimized away in order to save device resources. In this case, the egress data still passes through the ICV and MAC packing blocks.
Figure 16. GCM Depadding
Note: The MAC(16B) in the dash-line box indicates that the MAC is removed from the decryption packets when "Drop the MAC on applicable profile decryption" is enabled on the IP GUI.
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