Trusted CPU Feature Detection Library for Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX)

ID 660383
Updated 4/9/2019
Version Latest
Public

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File(s): Download
License: BSD 3-Clause License
Optimized for...  
Operating System: Linux*
Hardware: 6th gen Intel® Core™ or later, Intel® Xeon® E3 v6
Software:
(Programming Language, tool, IDE, Framework)
Linux*: gcc, Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK for Linux* (Intel® SGX SDK for Linux*)
Prerequisites: C/C++ programming

Introduction

This trusted library for Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) performs CPU feature detection for a select list of features and feature families.

Normally, an application should call the CPUID instruction to detect CPU features, but CPUID cannot be executed inside an enclave. Helper functions from the Intel SGX software development kit (SDK), such as sgx_cpuid() and sgx_cpuidex(), must make OCALLs to untrusted space. The Intel® Software Guard Extensions SDK developer reference warns:

As the CPUID instruction is executed by an OCALL, the results should not be trusted. Code should verify the results and perform a threat evaluation to determine the impact on trusted code if the results were spoofed.

Enclaves that depend on CPUID results for code path decisions could be manipulated by malicious software into choosing either inefficient algorithms or executing code paths with instructions that aren't supported by the CPU (leading to a #UD exception, which is effectively a denial of service attack). This library allows enclaves to detect CPU features without exiting the trusted runtime environment of the enclave. It supports both the Intel SGX SDK and the Microsoft* Open Enclave* trusted runtimes.

Note: This is not a general replacement for the sgx_cpuid() or sgx_cpuidex() calls but rather a supplement. An enclave may still need to call sgx_cpuid(), but those results can be merged with the results obtained from this library to ensure that the presence or absence of supported feature sets is accurately reported.

Supported Features

Feature CPUID Notation
ADX

CPUID.07H:EBX.ADX[bit 19]

AESNI

CPUID.01H:ECX.AESNI[bit 25]

AVX

CPUID.01H:ECX.AVX[bit 28]

AVX2

CPUID.07H:EBX.AVX2[bit 5]

AVX512DQ

CPUID.07H:EBX.AVX512DQ[bit 17]

AVX512F

CPUID.07H:EBX.AVX512F[bit 16]

AVX512VL

CPUID.07H:EBX.AVX512VL[bit 31]

BMI1

CPUID.07H:EBX.BMI1[bit 3]

BMI2

CPUID.07H:EBX.BMI2[bit 8]

F16C

CPUID.01H:ECX.F16C[bit 29]

FMA

CPUID.01H:ECX.FMA[bit 12]

MMX

CPUID.01H:EDX.MMX[bit 23]

PCLMULQDQ

CPUID.01H:ECX.PCLMULQDQ[bit 1]

POPCNT

CPUID.01H:ECX.POPCNT[bit 23]

RDRAND

CPUID.01H:ECX.RDRAND[bit 30]

RDSEED

CPUID.07H:EBX.RDSEED[bit 18]

SHA

CPUID.07H:EBX.SHA[bit 29]

SSE

CPUID.01H:EDX.SSE[bit 25]

SSE2

CPUID.01H:EDX.SSE2[bit 26]

SSE3

CPUID.01H:ECX.SSE3[bit 0]

SSE4.1

CPUID.01H:ECX.SSE4_1[bit 19]

SSE4.2

CPUID.01H:ECX.SSE4_2[bit 20]

SSSE3

CPUID.01H:ECX.SSSE3[bit 9]

 

Building and Installing the Library

To build this library you need one of the following SDKs:

You also need a C compiler, such as the GNU Compiler* (GCC), that is supported by the chosen SDK.

To build the package, type:

$ ./configure
$ make

To specify an installation directory, provide the --prefix option to “configure”.

Additional 'configure' options

--with-sgx-toolkit=NAME Specify toolkit to use for the Intel SGX build. Can
                        be one of: intel-sgxsdk, ms-openenclave (default:
                        intel-sgxsdk)

--with-sgxsdk=DIR       Specify the Intel SGX SDK directory (defaults to
                        auto-detection)

--with-openenclave=DIR  Specify the Open Enclave directory (defaults to
                        /opt/openenclave)

Running make will build both the trusted library and the sample application.

To install the library, type:

$ sudo make install

This will install into /usr/local unless you specified an installation directory when running configure.

Using the Library

To use this library, call sgx_cpuid_features_merge() immediately after executing CPUID in an OCALL. Examples for the Intel SGX SDK and the Microsoft* Open Enclave SDK are shown below.

Because this library has dependencies on the the trusted runtime, it must be built against the appropriate SDK. The build procedure will append a suffix, "_sgxsdk" for the Intel SGX SDK and "_oe" for the Microsoft Open Enclave SDK so that both versions can co-exist on the same system.

Intel SGX SDK

#include <sgx_tcpu_features.h>
#include <sgx_cpuid.h>

void sample_function(){
    sgx_status_t status;
    int info[4];

    status= sgx_cpuidex(info, 7, 0);
    if ( status == SGX_SUCCESS ) {
        sgx_cpuidex_features_merge(info, 7, 0);
    } else {
        /* Handle error */     
    }
}

To link this libary to your enclave, add “-lsgx_tcpu_features_sgxsdk” to the enclave's list of trusted libraries.

Microsoft OpenEnclave

#include <sgx_tcpu_features.h>
#include <openenclave/enclave.h>

void sample_function(){
    oe_result_t status;
    int info[4];

    status= oe_oc_cpuid(info, 7, 0);
    if ( status == OE_OK ) {
        sgx_cpuidex_features_merge(info, 7, 0);
    } else {
        /* Handle error */      
    }
}

To link this libary to your enclave, add -lsgx_tcpu_features_oe to the enclave's list of trusted libraries.

The Sample Application

This library has a sample application that prints the features detected on the CPU. It works with both the Intel SGX SDK and Microsoft Open Enclave SDK.

To see the detected features, type “./featureid”:

$ ./featureid

------------ Feature detection masks -------------------

Leaf 1, subleaf 0:
        31    24 23    16 15     8 7      0
  EAX = 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 = 0x00000000
  EBX = 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 = 0x00000000
  ECX = 01110010 10011000 00010010 00000011 = 0x72981203
  EDX = 00000110 10000000 00000000 00000000 = 0x06800000

  Features: AESNI AVX F16C FMA MMX PCLMULQDQ POPCNT RDRAND SSE SSE2 SSE3 SSSE3 SSE4.1 SSE4.2

Leaf 7, subleaf 0:
        31    24 23    16 15     8 7      0
  EAX = 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 = 0x00000000
  EBX = 10100000 00001111 00000001 00101000 = 0xa00f0128
  ECX = 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 = 0x00000000
  EDX = 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 = 0x00000000

  Features: ADX AVX2 AVX512F AVX512DQ AVX512VL BMI1 BMI2 RDSEED SHA

------------ Detected features -------------------------

Leaf 1, subleaf 0:
        31    24 23    16 15     8 7      0
  EAX = 00000000 00001001 00000110 11101010 = 0x000906ea
  EBX = 00000000 00000000 00001000 00000000 = 0x00000800
  ECX = 11111111 11111010 00110010 00100011 = 0xfffa3223
  EDX = 00001111 10001011 11111011 11111111 = 0x0f8bfbff

  Features: AESNI AVX F16C FMA MMX PCLMULQDQ POPCNT RDRAND SSE SSE2 SSE3 SSSE3 SSE4.1 SSE4.2

Leaf 7, subleaf 0:
        31    24 23    16 15     8 7      0
  EAX = 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 = 0x00000000
  EBX = 00000000 10011100 01001111 10111111 = 0x009c4fbf
  ECX = 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000100 = 0x00000004
  EDX = 10000100 00000000 00000000 00000000 = 0x84000000

  Features: ADX AVX2 BMI1 BMI2 RDSEED

Methodology

The first time any of the API functions are called, the library executes the trusted CPU feature detection procedure. The results are cached and future calls simply return the cached values.

The feature detection procedure is as follows:

  1. Set the bit for each supported feature (start by assuming all supported CPU features are available).
  2. For each supported feature, register an exception handler with the enclave's trusted runtime library (sgx_register_exception_handler if built for the Intel SGX SDK, and oe_add_vectored_exception_handler if built for the Microsoft Open Enclave SDK).
  3. Save the state of any registers that will be modified in step 4.
  4. Execute an instruction that is unique to the feature being probed.
  5. Restore the original value of any modified registers.

If the handler is not called, then the feature is supported and execution continues.

If the handler is called, execute the following sequence:

  1. Verify that the exception was generated by a #UD fault. If not, pass the exception to the next handler in the chain.
  2. Verify that the fault matches the instruction for the feature being probed. If not, pass the exception to the next handler in the chain.
  3. Clear the bit corresponding to that feature, indicating the 
    feature is not available on the CPU.
  4. Skip over the unsupported instruction by advancing the instruction pointer.

The library will automatically clear bits for features if their prerequisite features are not detected. For example, the AVX2 feature is an extension of AVX; if AVX is not present then AVX2 does not need to be checked and its feature bit can be cleared.

API

These functions perform runtime detection of CPU features and feature families without exiting the enclave to untrusted space:

#include <sgx_tcpu_features.h>

int sgx_cpuid_features_merge(int info[4]int leaf)

int sgx_cpuidex_features_merge(int info[4]int leafint subleaf)

int sgx_cpu_features(int info[4]int leafint subleaf)

int sgx_cpu_features_mask(int info[4]int leafint subleaf)

These functions perform runtime detection of CPU features and feature families without exiting the enclave to untrusted space.

int sgx_cpuid_features_merge and int sgx_cpuidex_features_merge take CPUID bitfields for EAX, EBX, ECX, and EDX stored in info for a given leaf and subleaf, probes for CPU features in that leaf and subleaf, and then replaces the bits in info with bits from the trusted CPU feature detection. The values in info are modified by these functions.

Internally, these functions call sgx_cpu_features_mask to zero out bits of the CPU features that it probes for, calls sgx_cpu_features to obtain the detected feature bits, and then ORs the two together. A simplified version of this routine is below:

sgx_cpu_features_mask(mask, leaf, subleaf);
sgx_cpu_features(info, leaf, subleaf);

for (i= 0; i< 4; ++i) {
  cpuinfo[i]&= ~mask[i];
  cpuinfo[i]|= info[i];
}

Note that sgx_cpuid_features_merge is implemented as a macro:

#define sgx_cpuid_features_merge(i,l) sgx_cpuidex_features_merge(i,l,0)

If the leaf and subleaf values do not correspond to supported CPUID feature bits then these functions are essentially a no-op, and the original value of info is unchanged.

sgx_cpu_features performs a trusted CPU feature detection for features corresponding to a given leaf and subleaf. It returns a bitfield for EAX, EBX, ECX, and EDX in info corresponding to the features that were detected. This does not call CPUID, and it only sets bits corresponding to features for which this library explicitly probes. Thus, it’s not a general replacement for CPUID.

sgx_cpu_features_mask returns the feature bits that the library supports for a given leaf and subleaf. EAX, EBX, ECX, and EDX are represented by info.

sgx_cpu_features_mask shows what features the library probes for, and “sgx_cpud_features” returns the features that are actually found. These latter two are low-level functions, and most developers would probably call one of the merge functions instead.

Return Values

sgx_cpu_features and sgx_cpu_features_mask return SGX_TCPUID_OK if the leaf and subleaf correspond to CPUID feature bits that the library supports.

A return value of SGX_TCPUID_UNSUPPORTEDLEAF means that leaf and subleaf do not correspond to CPUID-detected features that this library supports. This return value is not necessarily an error.

sgx_cpuid_features_merge and sgx_cpuidex_features_merge return SGX_TCPUID_OK on success. Attempting to merge CPUID values from an unsupported leaf and subleaf is still considered a success and is effectively a no-op.

Any other value is an error (currently these functions never fail).

Summary

The Trusted CPU Feature Detection Library for Intel SGX provides programmers with a means of probing for selected CPU features without leaving the trusted execution environment of the enclave. It’s a valuable component for security applications that depend on modern CPU features for both performance and side-channel resistance. The enclave can trust the set of detected features because the dependancy on the untrusted application has been removed, making it more difficult for malicious software to manipulate the results and, in turn, launch security downgrade or DoS attacks.

Using the library is often a simple matter of inserting one function immediately after a call to sgx_cpuid or sgx_cpuidex which makes integration into existing code easy.