# Improving the Performance of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1)

Published: 04/01/2010

Last Updated: 03/31/2010

**Improving the performance of the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) with Intel® Supplemental SSE3 instructions.**

**Introduction**

Nowadays we are seeing more and more services in the Internet and personal computing requiring secure data communications and storage. HTTPS with the SSL and TLS protocols are replacing non-secured HTTP traffic in online commerce, banking, secure web mail, and generally what is now being called The Internet Cloud. File system encryption is becoming ubiquitous on client operating systems as well as in enterprise solutions. In addition to security applications, we are seeing the usage of cryptographic hash algorithms in data de-duplication applications for storage and networking. These trends are very well reflected by the feedback we receive from our customers and partners who are seeing a continuous shift in their workload distribution towards more cryptographic computations. We are doing our best to address these compute intensive workloads. In 2010 Intel introduced AES-NI - new Intel Architecture (IA) instruction set extension for the Advanced Encryption Standards (AES) - first implemented in processors produced with 32-nm technology like Intel® Xeon® 5600 and 2010 Intel® Core^{TM} processor families, utilizing u-architecture codenamed ‘Westemere', with dramatic performance improvements [1]. We also found that it is possible to leverage previously introduced IA instruction set extensions with some algorithmic innovations to increase the performance of the widely used Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) [2]. This is the subject of this article.

**Brief history and prior implementations of SHA-1**

SHA-1 has been implemented many times in various software and hardware products, including implementations for the Intel Architecture instruction set. One must note that virtually all *widely used* software implementations of SHA-1 are using only scalar ALU operations on the general purpose register set, while Intel has introduced several generations of vector (or SIMD) instruction set extensions to IA32 and Intel64. Some of them, namely Intel SSE2, Intel Supplemental SSE3 (SSSE3) and Intel SSE4 are particularly useful for integer algorithms.

SHA-1 received its share of researchers' attention. Besides research devoted to the security aspects such as strength and potential weaknesses, there have also been explorations paying attention to implementation efficiency with regard to modern superscalar and parallel computer architectures, like [3] or [4]. The summary is that although generally SHA-1 is a vastly parallel algorithm in terms of instruction level parallelism (it would have been able to efficiently utilize up to 7 ALU pipelines), it does not suit itself easily for an efficient implementation with SIMD instruction set architectures. Our work, however, demonstrates that SHA-1 can efficiently use SIMD to better utilize the capabilities of IA for enhanced performance.

There have been attempts to implement SHA-1 with SSE2. One good example is the implementation made by Dean Gaudet [5]. We built on some of Dean's ideas with several new important improvements.

It would be appropriate for the reader who is not familiar with SHA-1 to give a brief introduction. Certainly more details can be found in [2] or [6].

SHA-1 produces a 160 bit (20 byte) hash value (digest), taking as an input a sequence of 1 or more 512 bit (64 byte) data blocks. The original source data also requires some padding according to the standard. The data is treated as an array of big-endian 32-bit values. Processing each of the 64-byte input blocks consists of 80 iterations also known as rounds.

Schematically SHA-1 looks like this using C-like syntax:

```
int F1(int B, int C, int D) { return (D ^ ( B & (C ^ D)); }
int F2(int B, int C, int D) { return (D ^ B ^ C); }
int F3(int B, int C, int D) { return (B & C) | (D & (B ^ C)); }
#define K1 0x5A827999
#define K2 0x6ED9EBA1
#define K3 0x8F1BBCDC
#define K4 0xCA62C1D6
int K( int i ) { return
i < 20 ? K1 :
i < 40 ? K2 :
i < 60 ? K3 : K4;
}
int F( int i, int B, int C, int D ) { return
i < 20 ? F1(B, C, D) :
i < 40 ? F2(B, C, D) :
i < 60 ? F3(B, C, D) :
F2(B, C, D) ;
}
// Update HASH[] by processing a one 64-byte block in MESSAGE[]
void SHA1( int HASH[], int MESSAGE[] )
{
// these arrays are not necessary but used to better highlight dependencies
int A[81], B[81], C[81], D[81], E[81];
int W[80];
int i, FN;
A[0] = HASH[0];
B[0] = HASH[1];
C[0] = HASH[2];
D[0] = HASH[3];
E[0] = HASH[4];
for ( i=0; i<80; ++i )
{
// W[i] calculation, also known as 'Message Scheduling'
if ( i < 16 )
// reverse the order of bytes on little-endian
W[i] = BIG_ENDIAN_LOAD( MESSAGE[i] );
else
W[i] = ROTATE_LEFT( W[i-3] ^ W[i-8] ^ W[i-14] ^ W[i-16], 1 );
FN = F( i, B[i], C[i], D[i] );
A[i+1] = FN + E[i] + ROTATE_LEFT( A[i], 5 ) + W[i] + K(i);
B[i+1] = A[i];
C[i+1] = ROTATE_LEFT( B[i], 30 );
D[i+1] = C[i];
E[i+1] = D[i];
}
HASH[0] += A[80];
HASH[1] += B[80];
HASH[2] += C[80];
HASH[3] += D[80];
HASH[4] += E[80];
}
```

**Employing SIMD to vectorize SHA-1 computation**

Intel SSE2 allows parallel operations on four 32-bit integers, stored in 128-bit XMM registers. The known SSE2 vectorization attempts of SHA-1 are rightfully focused on the message scheduling part for rounds 17-80, as a relatively isolated compute chain of W values which can be allocated in SIMD registers.

In the following statements:

```
W[i] = (W[i-3] ^ W[i-8] ^ W[i-14] ^ W[i-16]) rol 1; (**)
...
W[i] + K(i);
```

It is obvious, that the dependency ` W[i] -> W[i-3] `

prevents straightforward vectorization of this part for the architectures with vector lengths more than 3. There are two approaches to have it vectorized on the machine with registers of 4 elements:

1) The vectorization of only part of the expression: ` (W[i-8] ^ W[i-14] ^ W[i-16])`

```
W'[i ] = W[i-8] ^ W[i-14] ^ W[i-16]
W'[i+1] = W[i-7] ^ W[i-13] ^ W[i-15]
W'[i+2] = W[i-6] ^ W[i-12] ^ W[i-14]
W'[i+3] = W[i-5] ^ W[i-11] ^ W[i-13]
```

It takes 4 XMM registers to keep the last 16 W values. Vectors W[i-8:i-5] and W[i-16:i-13] are naturally aligned with XMM registers, while vector W[i-14:i-11] requires data from two different XMM registers. This can be most efficiently computed with the Intel® Supplemental SSE3 (SSSE3) instruction PALIGNR.

And then the scalar code does the rest of the computation steps:

```
W[i] = (W'[i] ^ W'[i-3]) rol 1; ... W[i] + K;
```

Note that the completed computation of W[i] needs to be reflected back to the vector side of the processor in time to be used in the next round of calculations.

2) Vectorize the whole expression plus more, overcoming dependency with additional iteration (approach by Dean Gaudet):

```
// done on 4 consequtive W[i] values in a single XMM register
W[i ] = (W[i-3] ^ W[i-8] ^ W[i-14] ^ W[i-16]) rol 1
W[i+1] = (W[i-2] ^ W[i-7] ^ W[i-13] ^ W[i-15]) rol 1
W[i+2] = (W[i-1] ^ W[i-6] ^ W[i-12] ^ W[i-14]) rol 1
W[i+3] = ( 0 ^ W[i-5] ^ W[i-11] ^ W[i-13]) rol 1
// this additional calculation unfortunately requires many additional operations
W[i+3] ^= W[i] rol 1
// once we have 4 W[i] values in XMM we can also add four K values with one instruction
W[i:i+3] += {K,K,K,K}
```

Both require either extensive amount of data shuffling between general purpose and XMM registers (1) or in XMM registers (2), and if applied for all rounds 17-80 end up being not much faster than the best available scalar code.

Our implementation uses 2^{nd} approach for the rounds 17-32 (4 vectorized iterations) only. But for the rounds 33 to 80 we came up with the improved vectorization presented below.

**Equal transformation of SHA-1 algorithm to remove vectorization overhead**

The 2^{nd} approach relies on the following distributive identity:

```
(A ^ B) rol C = (A rol C) ^ (B rol C) (1)
```

Let's also employ another one. If W defined as:

```
W[i] = W[i-A] ^ W[i-B]
```

Then, as can be shown with basic substitution (see below), it is equivalent to:

```
W[i] = W[i-2*A] ^ W[i-2*B] (2)
```

if values (i-2*A) and (i-2*B) are still in the defined range for i

For those curious to see the proof of it:

If (i-2*A) and (i-2*B) are in the defined range for i, then:

By substitution:

```
W[i-A] = W[i-A-A] ^ W[i-A-B];
W[i-B] = W[i-B-A] ^ W[i-B-B];
W[i] = (W[i-A-A] ^ W[i-A-B]) ^ (W[i-B-A] ^ W[i-B-B]);
```

Considering that: W[i-A-B] = W[i-B-A];

```
W[i] = W[i-A-A] ^ W[i-B-B];
W[i] = W[i-2*A] ^ W[i-2*B] QED.
```

We need one more basic identity:

```
(X rol 1) rol 1 = X rol 2 (3)
```

Now, if we apply (2) in an extended form for four elements being XOR'ed instead of two, with rotates and XOR distribution identities (1) and (3) to the statement (**) calculating W[i] in SHA-1, it allows the following transformation:

```
W[i] = (W[i-3] ^ W[i- 8] ^ W[i-14] ^ W[i-16]) rol 1
```

for i>32, is equivalent to:

```
W[i] = (W[i-6] ^ W[i-16] ^ W[i-28] ^ W[i-32]) rol 2 (4)
```

The outcome is that the dependency W[i]->W[i-3] was transformed into W[i]->W[i-6], without increasing the amount of calculations, thanks to mutual cancelling of equal values with XOR. It can now be vectorized with 4 element SIMD in a very straightforward way for rounds 33-80. Also quite fortunately vectors W[i-16], W[i-28] and W[i-32] align themselves perfectly with XMM registers, each of which keeps 4 elements of array W[], and only the one starting at W[i-6] requires forming the vector from the two "neighbour" XMM registers. This still can be handled very efficiently with a single SSSE3 PALIGNR instruction. The snippet of the vectorized code to compute 4 W values for the rounds 33-80 is below (all W's below are XMM registers, each keeping 4 consecutive values as defined by algorithm):

```
movdqa W_TMP, W_minus_04
pxor W, W_minus_28 ; W equals W[i-32:i-29] before XOR
; W = W[i-32:i-29] ^ W[i-28:i-25]
palignr W_TMP, W_minus_08, 8 ; W_TMP = W[i-6:i-3], combined from
; W[i-4:i-1] and W[i-8:i-5] vectors
pxor W, W_minus_16 ; W = (W[i-32:i-29] ^ W[i-28:i-25]) ^ W[i-16:i-13]
pxor W, W_TMP ; W = (W[i-32:i-29] ^ W[i-28:i-25] ^ W[i-16:i-13]) ^ W[i-6:i-3])
movdqa W_TMP, W ; 4 dwords in W are rotated left by 2
psrld W, 30 ; rotate left by 2 W = (W >> 30) | (W << 2)
pslld W_TMP, 2
por W_TMP, W
movdqa W, W_TMP ; four new W values W[i:i+3] are now calculated
paddd W_TMP, [K_XMM] ; adding 4 current round's values of K
movdqa [WK(i)], W_TMP ; storing for downstream GPR instructions to read
```

In the end four values of W[i]+K are calculated in W_TMP XMM register, then we use memory instructions (every 128-bit store is later read by four 32-bit loads) as a way to move precalculated data from XMM to general purpose registers domain. It allows offloading of these operations to memory unit where stores and loads can be executed independently from ALU operations. Latency of the L1 cache store plus load is either completely hidden since W pre-computation can be scheduled early or served by store to load forwarding mechanism in the microarchitecture.

There are a few other improvements worth mentioning. The use of SSSE3 instruction PSHUFB allows efficient conversion between big- and little-endian data formats for rounds 1 to 16, where values of W[i] are read from the message data, 4 values are converted by a single PSHUFB instruction. The other optimization is software pipelining: if an application uses the interface to SHA-1 update function such that it allows to process several continuous 64-byte blocks at one call, then applying software pipelining (also used by Dean in his implementation) may give about 5% to 10% of additional performance improvement.

**Performance benefits and integration**

The overall performance improvement of this implementation over the best known scalar implementations ranges from ~1.2X to ~1.5X, achieving as low as 5.8 cycles per byte on 1024-byte buffer being hashed on the latest generations of Intel processors. Also, here at Intel, we have a unique opportunity to use performance simulators to measure performance and tune the code for the several future generations of processors in a development pipeline. This code was very well tuned and will maintain and improve its performance advantage over the scalar implementations going forward.

We are providing 64-bit assembly implementation of SHA-1 using platform independent NASM[7] syntax (it was also tested with YASM[8]). We wanted the final performance to be the best and independent of the platform and compiler being used. Assembler, in the case of SHA-1, has a solid performance advantage over C/C++ code with all the compilers we tried. The speedups ranged from large to moderate. Coding in assembly language allowed perfect control over the instruction scheduling as well as register allocation, which compilers cannot yet achieve. The assembly code employs macros efficiently to remain high-level. The code should be easy to integrate into existing applications. Please refer to the instructions in the beginning of the source file. We took care of the CPUID SSSE3 feature flag check and dispatch. A 32-bit version may show up later too, although it must be noted that the smaller number of registers available to 32-bit apps will impact performance compared to 64-bit code.

**Finale**

This implementation notably advances the performance of SHA-1 algorithm compared to existing implementations. We are encouraging all projects utilizing SHA-1 to integrate this new fast implementation and are ready to help if issues or concerns arise (you are welcome to leave a comment or write an email to the authors). It is provided 'as is' and free for either commercial or non-commercial use. We are already working with several interested customers and open source projects to integrate it. Hopefully you will see this SHA-1 implementation as a part of OpenSSL library, and, of course, Intel® Integrated Performance Primitives will have it soon too.

I would like to thank and give credit to Dean Gaudet for his SHA-1 vectorization research, with several key ideas used in this implementation, as well as to a few exceptional engineers from various corners of Intel who contributed to this arguably world-best SHA-1 implementation for IA at the moment. They are: Ronen Zohar, Jim Guilford, Vinodh Gopal, Wajdi Feghali, Mark Buxton, Shay Gueron, Zino Benaissa and Anu Suryanarayanan. Thank you very much.

**Appendix A.**

```
;---------------------
;
; This code implements two interfaces of SHA-1 update function: 1) working on a single
; 64-byte block and 2) working on a buffer of multiple 64-bit blocks. Multiple blocks
; version of code is software pipelined and faster overall, it is a default. Assemble
; with -DINTEL_SHA1_SINGLEBLOCK to select single 64-byte block function interface.
;
; C++ prototypes of implemented functions are below:
;
; #ifndef INTEL_SHA1_SINGLEBLOCK
; // Updates 20-byte SHA-1 record in 'hash' for 'num_blocks' consequtive 64-byte blocks
; extern "C" void sha1_update_intel(int *hash, const char* input, size_t num_blocks );
; #else
; // Updates 20-byte SHA-1 record in 'hash' for one 64-byte block pointed by 'input'
; extern "C" void sha1_update_intel(int *hash, const char* input);
; #endif
;
; Function name 'sha1_update_intel' can be changed in the source or via macro:
; -DINTEL_SHA1_UPDATE_FUNCNAME=my_sha1_update_func_name
;
; It implements both UNIX(default) and Windows ABIs, use -DWIN_ABI on Windows
;
; Code checks CPU for SSSE3 support via CPUID feature flag (CPUID.1.ECX.SSSE3[bit 9]==1),
; and performs dispatch. Since in most cases the functionality on non-SSSE3 supporting CPUs
; is also required, the default (e.g. one being replaced) function can be provided for
; dispatch on such CPUs, the name of old function can be changed in the source or via macro:
; -DINTEL_SHA1_UPDATE_DEFAULT_DISPATCH=default_sha1_update_function_name
;
; Authors: Maxim Locktyukhin and Ronen Zohar at Intel.com
;
%ifndef INTEL_SHA1_UPDATE_DEFAULT_DISPATCH
;; can be replaced with a default SHA-1 update function name
%define INTEL_SHA1_UPDATE_DEFAULT_DISPATCH sha1_intel_non_ssse3_cpu_stub_
%else
extern INTEL_SHA1_UPDATE_DEFAULT_DISPATCH
%endif
;; provide alternative SHA-1 update function's name here
%ifndef INTEL_SHA1_UPDATE_FUNCNAME
%define INTEL_SHA1_UPDATE_FUNCNAME sha1_update_intel
%endif
global INTEL_SHA1_UPDATE_FUNCNAME
%ifndef INTEL_SHA1_SINGLEBLOCK
%assign multiblock 1
%else
%assign multiblock 0
%endif
bits 64
default rel
%ifdef WIN_ABI
%xdefine arg1 rcx
%xdefine arg2 rdx
%xdefine arg3 r8
%else
%xdefine arg1 rdi
%xdefine arg2 rsi
%xdefine arg3 rdx
%endif
%xdefine ctx arg1
%xdefine buf arg2
%xdefine cnt arg3
%macro REGALLOC 0
%xdefine A ecx
%xdefine B esi
%xdefine C edi
%xdefine D ebp
%xdefine E edx
%xdefine T1 eax
%xdefine T2 ebx
%endmacro
%xdefine K_BASE r8
%xdefine HASH_PTR r9
%xdefine BUFFER_PTR r10
%xdefine BUFFER_END r11
%xdefine W_TMP xmm0
%xdefine W_TMP2 xmm9
%xdefine W0 xmm1
%xdefine W4 xmm2
%xdefine W8 xmm3
%xdefine W12 xmm4
%xdefine W16 xmm5
%xdefine W20 xmm6
%xdefine W24 xmm7
%xdefine W28 xmm8
%xdefine XMM_SHUFB_BSWAP xmm10
;; we keep window of 64 w[i]+K pre-calculated values in a circular buffer
%xdefine WK(t) (rsp + (t & 15)*4)
;------------------------------------------------------------------------------
;
; macro implements SHA-1 function's body for single or several 64-byte blocks
; first param: function's name
; second param: =0 - function implements single 64-byte block hash
; =1 - function implements multiple64-byte blocks hash
; 3rd function's argument is a number, greater 0, of 64-byte blocks to calc hash for
;
%macro SHA1_VECTOR_ASM 2
align 4096
%1:
push rbx
push rbp
%ifdef WIN_ABI
push rdi
push rsi
%xdefine stack_size (16*4 + 16*5 + 8)
%else
%xdefine stack_size (16*4 + 8)
%endif
sub rsp, stack_size
%ifdef WIN_ABI
%xdefine xmm_save_base (rsp + 16*4)
xmm_mov [xmm_save_base + 0*16], xmm6
xmm_mov [xmm_save_base + 1*16], xmm7
xmm_mov [xmm_save_base + 2*16], xmm8
xmm_mov [xmm_save_base + 3*16], xmm9
xmm_mov [xmm_save_base + 4*16], xmm10
%endif
mov HASH_PTR, ctx
mov BUFFER_PTR, buf
%if (%2 == 1)
shl cnt, 6 ;; mul by 64
add cnt, buf
mov BUFFER_END, cnt
%endif
lea K_BASE, [K_XMM_AR]
xmm_mov XMM_SHUFB_BSWAP, [bswap_shufb_ctl]
SHA1_PIPELINED_MAIN_BODY %2
%ifdef WIN_ABI
xmm_mov xmm6, [xmm_save_base + 0*16]
xmm_mov xmm7, [xmm_save_base + 1*16]
xmm_mov xmm8, [xmm_save_base + 2*16]
xmm_mov xmm9, [xmm_save_base + 3*16]
xmm_mov xmm10,[xmm_save_base + 4*16]
%endif
add rsp, stack_size
%ifdef WIN_ABI
pop rsi
pop rdi
%endif
pop rbp
pop rbx
ret
%endmacro
;--------------------------------------------
; macro implements 80 rounds of SHA-1, for one 64-byte block or multiple blocks with s/w pipelining
; macro param: =0 - process single 64-byte block
; =1 - multiple blocks
;
%macro SHA1_PIPELINED_MAIN_BODY 1
REGALLOC
mov A, [HASH_PTR ]
mov B, [HASH_PTR+ 4]
mov C, [HASH_PTR+ 8]
mov D, [HASH_PTR+12]
mov E, [HASH_PTR+16]
%assign i 0
%rep W_PRECALC_AHEAD
W_PRECALC i
%assign i i+1
%endrep
%xdefine F F1
%if (%1 == 1) ;; code loops through more than one block
%%_loop:
cmp BUFFER_PTR, K_BASE ;; we use K_BASE value as a signal of a last block,
jne %%_begin ;; it is set below by: cmovae BUFFER_PTR, K_BASE
jmp %%_end
align 32
%%_begin:
%endif
RR A,B,C,D,E,0
RR D,E,A,B,C,2
RR B,C,D,E,A,4
RR E,A,B,C,D,6
RR C,D,E,A,B,8
RR A,B,C,D,E,10
RR D,E,A,B,C,12
RR B,C,D,E,A,14
RR E,A,B,C,D,16
RR C,D,E,A,B,18
%xdefine F F2
RR A,B,C,D,E,20
RR D,E,A,B,C,22
RR B,C,D,E,A,24
RR E,A,B,C,D,26
RR C,D,E,A,B,28
RR A,B,C,D,E,30
RR D,E,A,B,C,32
RR B,C,D,E,A,34
RR E,A,B,C,D,36
RR C,D,E,A,B,38
%xdefine F F3
RR A,B,C,D,E,40
RR D,E,A,B,C,42
RR B,C,D,E,A,44
RR E,A,B,C,D,46
RR C,D,E,A,B,48
RR A,B,C,D,E,50
RR D,E,A,B,C,52
RR B,C,D,E,A,54
RR E,A,B,C,D,56
RR C,D,E,A,B,58
%xdefine F F4
%if (%1 == 1) ;; if code loops through more than one block
add BUFFER_PTR, 64 ;; move to next 64-byte block
cmp BUFFER_PTR, BUFFER_END ;; check if current block is the last one
cmovae BUFFER_PTR, K_BASE ;; smart way to signal the last iteration
%else
%xdefine W_NO_TAIL_PRECALC 1 ;; no software pipelining for single block interface
%endif
RR A,B,C,D,E,60
RR D,E,A,B,C,62
RR B,C,D,E,A,64
RR E,A,B,C,D,66
RR C,D,E,A,B,68
RR A,B,C,D,E,70
RR D,E,A,B,C,72
RR B,C,D,E,A,74
RR E,A,B,C,D,76
RR C,D,E,A,B,78
UPDATE_HASH [HASH_PTR ],A
UPDATE_HASH [HASH_PTR+ 4],B
UPDATE_HASH [HASH_PTR+ 8],C
UPDATE_HASH [HASH_PTR+12],D
UPDATE_HASH [HASH_PTR+16],E
%if (%1 == 1)
jmp %%_loop
align 32
%%_end:
%endif
%xdefine W_NO_TAIL_PRECALC 0
%xdefine F %error
%endmacro
%macro F1 3
mov T1,%2
xor T1,%3
and T1,%1
xor T1,%3
%endmacro
%macro F2 3
mov T1,%3
xor T1,%2
xor T1,%1
%endmacro
%macro F3 3
mov T1,%2
mov T2,%1
or T1,%1
and T2,%2
and T1,%3
or T1,T2
%endmacro
%define F4 F2
%macro UPDATE_HASH 2
add %2, %1
mov %1, %2
%endmacro
%macro W_PRECALC 1
%xdefine i (%1)
%if (i < 20)
%xdefine K_XMM 0
%elif (i < 40)
%xdefine K_XMM 16
%elif (i < 60)
%xdefine K_XMM 32
%else
%xdefine K_XMM 48
%endif
%if (i<16 || (i>=80 && i<(80 + W_PRECALC_AHEAD)))
%if (W_NO_TAIL_PRECALC == 0)
%xdefine i ((%1) % 80) ;; pre-compute for the next iteration
%if (i == 0)
W_PRECALC_RESET
%endif
W_PRECALC_00_15
%endif
%elif (i < 32)
W_PRECALC_16_31
%elif (i < 80) ;; rounds 32-79
W_PRECALC_32_79
%endif
%endmacro
%macro W_PRECALC_RESET 0
%xdefine W W0
%xdefine W_minus_04 W4
%xdefine W_minus_08 W8
%xdefine W_minus_12 W12
%xdefine W_minus_16 W16
%xdefine W_minus_20 W20
%xdefine W_minus_24 W24
%xdefine W_minus_28 W28
%xdefine W_minus_32 W
%endmacro
%macro W_PRECALC_ROTATE 0
%xdefine W_minus_32 W_minus_28
%xdefine W_minus_28 W_minus_24
%xdefine W_minus_24 W_minus_20
%xdefine W_minus_20 W_minus_16
%xdefine W_minus_16 W_minus_12
%xdefine W_minus_12 W_minus_08
%xdefine W_minus_08 W_minus_04
%xdefine W_minus_04 W
%xdefine W W_minus_32
%endmacro
%xdefine W_PRECALC_AHEAD 16
%xdefine W_NO_TAIL_PRECALC 0
%xdefine xmm_mov movdqa
%macro W_PRECALC_00_15 0
;; message scheduling pre-compute for rounds 0-15
%if ((i & 3) == 0) ;; blended SSE and ALU instruction scheduling, 1 vector iteration per 4 rounds
movdqu W_TMP, [BUFFER_PTR + (i * 4)]
%elif ((i & 3) == 1)
pshufb W_TMP, XMM_SHUFB_BSWAP
movdqa W, W_TMP
%elif ((i & 3) == 2)
paddd W_TMP, [K_BASE]
%elif ((i & 3) == 3)
movdqa [WK(i&~3)], W_TMP
W_PRECALC_ROTATE
%endif
%endmacro
%macro W_PRECALC_16_31 0
;; message scheduling pre-compute for rounds 16-31
;; calculating last 32 w[i] values in 8 XMM registers
;; pre-calculate K+w[i] values and store to mem, for later load by ALU add instruction
;;
;; "brute force" vectorization for rounds 16-31 only due to w[i]->w[i-3] dependency
;;
%if ((i & 3) == 0) ;; blended SSE and ALU instruction scheduling, 1 vector iteration per 4 rounds
movdqa W, W_minus_12
palignr W, W_minus_16, 8 ;; w[i-14]
movdqa W_TMP, W_minus_04
psrldq W_TMP, 4 ;; w[i-3]
pxor W, W_minus_08
%elif ((i & 3) == 1)
pxor W_TMP, W_minus_16
pxor W, W_TMP
movdqa W_TMP2, W
movdqa W_TMP, W
pslldq W_TMP2, 12
%elif ((i & 3) == 2)
psrld W, 31
pslld W_TMP, 1
por W_TMP, W
movdqa W, W_TMP2
psrld W_TMP2, 30
pslld W, 2
%elif ((i & 3) == 3)
pxor W_TMP, W
pxor W_TMP, W_TMP2
movdqa W, W_TMP
paddd W_TMP, [K_BASE + K_XMM]
movdqa [WK(i&~3)],W_TMP
W_PRECALC_ROTATE
%endif
%endmacro
%macro W_PRECALC_32_79 0
;; in SHA-1 specification: w[i] = (w[i-3] ^ w[i-8] ^ w[i-14] ^ w[i-16]) rol 1
;; instead we do equal: w[i] = (w[i-6] ^ w[i-16] ^ w[i-28] ^ w[i-32]) rol 2
;; allows more efficient vectorization since w[i]=>w[i-3] dependency is broken
;;
%if ((i & 3) == 0) ;; blended SSE and ALU instruction scheduling, 1 vector iteration per 4 rounds
movdqa W_TMP, W_minus_04
pxor W, W_minus_28 ;; W is W_minus_32 before xor
palignr W_TMP, W_minus_08, 8
%elif ((i & 3) == 1)
pxor W, W_minus_16
pxor W, W_TMP
movdqa W_TMP, W
%elif ((i & 3) == 2)
psrld W, 30
pslld W_TMP, 2
por W_TMP, W
%elif ((i & 3) == 3)
movdqa W, W_TMP
paddd W_TMP, [K_BASE + K_XMM]
movdqa [WK(i&~3)],W_TMP
W_PRECALC_ROTATE
%endif
%endmacro
%macro RR 6 ;; RR does two rounds of SHA-1 back to back with W pre-calculation
;; TEMP = A
;; A = F( i, B, C, D ) + E + ROTATE_LEFT( A, 5 ) + W[i] + K(i)
;; C = ROTATE_LEFT( B, 30 )
;; D = C
;; E = D
;; B = TEMP
W_PRECALC (%6 + W_PRECALC_AHEAD)
F %2, %3, %4 ;; F returns result in T1
add %5, [WK(%6)]
rol %2, 30
mov T2, %1
add %4, [WK(%6 + 1)]
rol T2, 5
add %5, T1
W_PRECALC (%6 + W_PRECALC_AHEAD + 1)
add T2, %5
mov %5, T2
rol T2, 5
add %4, T2
F %1, %2, %3 ;; F returns result in T1
add %4, T1
rol %1, 30
;; write: %1, %2
;; rotate: %1<=%4, %2<=%5, %3<=%1, %4<=%2, %5<=%3
%endmacro
;;----------------------
section .data align=128
%xdefine K1 0x5a827999
%xdefine K2 0x6ed9eba1
%xdefine K3 0x8f1bbcdc
%xdefine K4 0xca62c1d6
align 128
K_XMM_AR:
DD K1, K1, K1, K1
DD K2, K2, K2, K2
DD K3, K3, K3, K3
DD K4, K4, K4, K4
align 16
bswap_shufb_ctl:
DD 00010203h
DD 04050607h
DD 08090a0bh
DD 0c0d0e0fh
;; dispatch pointer, points to the init routine for the first invocation
sha1_update_intel_dispatched:
DQ sha1_update_intel_init_
;;----------------------
section .text align=4096
SHA1_VECTOR_ASM sha1_update_intel_ssse3_, multiblock
align 32
sha1_update_intel_init_: ;; we get here with the first time invocation
call sha1_update_intel_dispacth_init_
INTEL_SHA1_UPDATE_FUNCNAME: ;; we get here after init
jmp qword [sha1_update_intel_dispatched]
;; CPUID feature flag based dispatch
sha1_update_intel_dispacth_init_:
push rax
push rbx
push rcx
push rdx
push rsi
lea rsi, [INTEL_SHA1_UPDATE_DEFAULT_DISPATCH]
mov eax, 1
cpuid
test ecx, 0200h ;; SSSE3 support, CPUID.1.ECX[bit 9]
jz _done
lea rsi, [sha1_update_intel_ssse3_]
_done:
mov [sha1_update_intel_dispatched], rsi
pop rsi
pop rdx
pop rcx
pop rbx
pop rax
ret
;;----------------------
;; in the case a default SHA-1 update function implementation was not provided
;; and code was invoked on a non-SSSE3 supporting CPU, dispatch handles this
;; failure in a safest way - jumps to the stub function with UD2 instruction below
sha1_intel_non_ssse3_cpu_stub_:
ud2 ;; in the case no default SHA-1 was provided non-SSSE3 CPUs safely fail here
ret
; END
;----------------------
```

**References**

[1] "FIPS PUB 180-1, SECURE HASH STANDARD"

[2] Intel® Advanced Encryption Standard Instructions (AES-NI)

[3] "SHA: A Design for Parallel Architectures?" PDF

[4] "Analysis of SIMD Applicability to SHA Algorithms" PDF

[5] http://arctic.org/~dean/crypto/sha1.html

[6] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA_hash_functions#SHA-1

[8] The Yasm Modular Assembler Project

[9] Small Business to Big Business Solutions

[10] Intel® AES-NI Performance Testing on Linux*/Java* Stack

[11] Introduction to Intel® AES-NI and Intel® Secure Key Instructions

[12] Modern Code

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#### Product and Performance Information

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Performance varies by use, configuration and other factors. Learn more at www.Intel.com/PerformanceIndex.