Authentication of the Second-Stage Boot Loader
The security features of the Intel® Arria® 10 SoC provide you with resources to enforce that only a trusted second-stage boot loader is executed from the HPS. The boot ROM executes the first stage and enforces user security settings. During authentication, the Boot ROM verifies the HPS security fuse settings through the HPS_fusesec shadow registers.
- On FPGA power-up, the CSS powers, initializes and loads the fuse bits. The CSS sends the FPGA its fuse configuration information. If the HPS is powered, the CSS sends the HPS fuse information to the Security Manager. This information is held in the HPS_fusesec shadow register in the Security Manager.
- When the Security Manager is released from reset, it requests configuration information from the CSS and performs security checks. At this point, the rest of the HPS is still in reset. The security checks validate whether the state of each security option is valid. The Security Manager decodes the fuse bits and brings the rest of the HPS out of reset.
- When the HPS is released from reset, the Security Manager sends signals to initialize the system blocks, such as the Clock Manager, FPGA Manager, and System Manager. The clock control fuse information is automatically sent to the Clock Manager, the memory control fuse information is automatically sent to the Reset Manager and all other fuse functions (authentication, encryption, and public key source and length) are stored in a memory-mapped location for the boot ROM code to read. After these tasks are successfully completed, CPU0 comes out of reset in a secure state.
- After CPU0 is released from reset, the boot ROM begins executing. At this time, the HPS is in a trusted state and the boot ROM code is guaranteed to execute as expected. For both secure and non-secure boot, all slave peripherals are brought out of reset in a secure state.
- The boot ROM determines the boot flash partition and verifies the security header settings of the second-stage boot loader image. The second-stage boot loader requires a signed certificate to be authenticated.
- The Boot ROM determines the source of the root key by reading the security header.
- The boot ROM attempts to authenticate the boot image. If authentication is successful, the boot ROM then continues with the process of loading and executing the image.
Did you find the information on this page useful?