Secure Access of Performance Monitoring Unit by User Space Profilers

White Paper

This paper proposes a software mechanism targeting performance profilers which would run at user space privilege to access performance monitoring hardware, the latter requires privileged access in kernel mode, in a secure manner without causing unintended interference to the software stack.

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Introduction

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## Revision History

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<tr>
<td>334467-001</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>• Initial release of the document.</td>
<td>June 2016</td>
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</tbody>
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Introduction

Performance monitoring units (PMUs) are present in all modern Intel processor generations, allowing profiling utilities to characterize the interaction between software and CPU resources using a rich set of performance metrics. Profilers are critical tools for software to harvest optimal performance out of the CPU hardware.

The programming interfaces that profiling utilities use to access PMUs or related hardware resources consist of:

- A set of instructions (some require privilege access available only in kernel mode, like RDMSR, WRMSR).
- PMU configuration resources: these are typically Model Specific Registers (MSRs).
- Counter register resources: these can include performance counters in the PMU as well as other counter registers accessible as MSRs.

Traditionally, profiling utilities employ special device drivers operating with ring 0 privilege to configure the PMU, access counter registers, and handle interrupts if the profiler supports sampling (i.e. capture samples of incremental data at fine-grain intervals).

Some OS, such as Linux, provide API access for root privileged user programs to access privileged resources (such as MSRs). When a user program’s profiling needs can be served by counting of events (without the need to capture incremental samples), it is often possible and desirable to implement the profiler as a ring 3 application to make use of these privileged APIs. This simplifies development and deployment of the profiler compared to the traditional approaches of a kernel based driver solution with a command line front-end parser.

For security reasons in multi-user OS, the OS only allows access to privileged resources by root users. This implies that the monitoring tool would run with full root rights and have rights to operate privileged resources (as permitted by those API) beyond just monitoring performance events.

To configure and use the PMU, read and write accesses to some PMU MSRs are needed by a user-space profiler. However, having full write access to the entire set of MSRs in a CPU can compromise the OS. Thus, full root rights and write access to full set MSRs should be selectively provisioned to a user-space profiler. On secured shared server systems or securely booted clients with secured kernels full MSR access is usually not available.

The goal of this white paper is to define a subset of MSRs and mechanism with the following in mind:

- Writes to the subset of MSRs are to configure performance metric selection and conduct monitoring of the counter registers, without changing any non-PMU states.
• Define write masks that are applicable to the subset of MSRs to ensure the user-space profiler operates within the intended monitoring mode (i.e. counting).

• A bridge between the OS-API requirement of full root rights and the desired non-root permission for user-space applications.

• Allow collecting performance metrics of the whole system, but do not modify any other state.

A specialized MSR access layer can then give the monitoring tool only access to this safe “monitoring only” subset of MSRs and allow it to run the monitoring as non-root, without risking compromising the system.

Note that monitoring access is still opt-in by the administrator and cannot be done without an explicit configuration change.

1.1 Scope

The scope is largely focused on monitoring for the processor core PMU. Intel platforms have additional PMUs outside the processor core such as the uncore or the chipset. Those are not covered by this white paper.
2 Implementation

2.1 Security Model

This white paper define a new "global monitoring only" privilege level for an application. The administrator has to explicitly grant this privilege level to an application. The privilege allows monitoring performance events on all processes of the complete system, but does not change any global state not accessible by an unprivileged application.

The privilege level gives read and write access to a limited number of MSRs in the logical processor and the physical package. Filtering of input settings specified by the application is written to the MSRs by a privileged software layer (kernel driver or a special secure access layer). The active settings of the MSRs reflect the configuration of the performance monitoring hardware.

Input from the non-root application to change any of the secured monitoring registers does not allow:

- Reading or writing any data in memory or in data registers.
- Triggering interrupts.
- Changing state of processes outside the monitoring tool.
- In general, the expectation of performance impact to the target system due to enabling monitoring hardware and the software layer is minimal.

Input from the non-root application permit the following changes to the secured monitoring registers:

- Selection of performance monitoring counter events which are supported by the PMU, as well as (optionally) conditioning of performance counter results (e.g. thresholding, edge triggering).
- This includes the ability to monitor events such as cache misses, branch mispredictions and other architectural and micro architectural events.

The administrator can choose whether ring 0 (kernel) or only all user mode can be monitored.

2.2 Access Layer Requirements

The secure access layer should implement the following functionality:

- Allow specific software access without requiring the software to run with full administrator rights.
- Allowing access to specific white listed MSR registers, as documented in this document.
• Enforce that some registers are read only and that some registers have bits write protected.
• Catching #GP General Protection faults when accessing MSRs and return an error.

2.3 Sharing Model

Write access to the PMU registers by one global monitoring software process can disturb other monitoring tools operating under the same system executive. To allow sharing between different monitoring tools the tool should follow the protocol specified in the Intel Performance Monitoring unit sharing guide (www.intel.com/sdm or https://software.intel.com/file/30388).

Generally this means checking enable bits for programmable counters and not changing the configuration if the counter is already running. Free running counters can be always shared, but should not be written to.

2.4 Architectural Perfmon vs. Model Specific

Some registers are architectural and can be discovered through the CPUID instruction. Other registers are model specific.

2.5 Counter Wrapping

With the secure access restrictions it is not possible to get an interrupt on counter overflow. Software instead needs to poll the counter registers in sufficiently short time intervals to accumulate values before they overflow.

2.6 List of Registers for Secure Access by User-Space Profilers

MSR registers available in Intel processors for user-space profilers via a secure access layer are listed below. Availability of a given MSR in an Intel processor is enumerated either by CPUID feature information or by model-specific signatures reported in Display_Family, Display_Model values returned in CPUID instruction leaf 1 function.

In general, only Intel processors with DisplayFamily = 0x6 are applicable targets of this paper. MSR information applicable to DisplayModel values of 0x1E, 0x1F, 0x1A, 0x2F, 0x25, 0x2C, 0x2E, 0x37, 0x4D, 0x4C, 0x1C, 0x26, 0x27, 0x36, 0x35, 0x2A, 0x2D, 0x3A, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0x45, 0x46, 0x3C, 0x3F, 0x3D, 0x47, 0x56, 0x4E, 0x5E, 0x57 are summarized by category.

Unless otherwise marked all bits in the register can be securely accessed.

Note: For more details on the individual registers, see the Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer Manuals (www.intel.com/sdm).
### Table 2-1. Configuration Registers for PMU and Non-PMU Counters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IA32_PERF_EVENTSELx</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>0x186+x, x = 0, n-1; n = CPUID.10:EAX[15:8]</td>
<td>Select performance monitoring events and associated configurations.</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td>Ring 0 access mask 0xffffffffff, otherwise 0xffa5ffff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA32_FIXED_CTRCTL</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>0x38d</td>
<td>Configure fixed counters.</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td>Ring 0 access mask 0x333, otherwise 0x111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA32_PERF_GLOBALCTRL</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>0x38f</td>
<td>Global control to enable/disable fixed counters and performance counters.</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td>Access mask 0xffffffff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>0x1a6</td>
<td>Configure event-specific mask for OFFCORE_RSP_0 event.</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Writing reserved bits may #GP;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_1</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>0x1a7</td>
<td>Configure event-specific mask for OFFCORE_RSP_1 event.</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Writing reserved bits may #GP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES</td>
<td>R/O</td>
<td>0x345</td>
<td>Enumerate Perfmon capability.</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR_RAPL_POWER_UNIT</td>
<td>R/O</td>
<td>0x606</td>
<td>Enumerate Granularity of RAPL Energy Status Counters.</td>
<td>Package</td>
<td>Not available to DisplayModels=0x1E, 0x1F, 0x1A, 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x25, 0x2C, 0x1C, 0x26, 0x27, 0x35, 0x36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2-2. PMU Counter Registers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>MSR Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IA32_PERFCTRx</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>0xc1+x, x = 0, n-1; n = CPUID.10:EAX[15:8]</td>
<td>Value of counter x associated with configured performance event.</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA32_PMCx</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>0x4c1+x, x = 0, n-1; n = CPUID.10:EAX[15:8]</td>
<td>Full-width=writable counter x.</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA32_FIXED_CTRx</td>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>0x309+x</td>
<td>Value of fixed counter x</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2-3. Other Counter Registers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Scope</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSR_CORE_C1_RESIDENCY</td>
<td>R/O</td>
<td>0x660</td>
<td>Duration in core C1 state.</td>
<td>Core</td>
<td>Only in DisplayModels= 0x37, 0x4D, 0x4A, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0x4C, 0x5C, 0x5F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY</td>
<td>R/O</td>
<td>0x3fc</td>
<td>Duration in core C3 states.</td>
<td>Core</td>
<td>Not available to DisplayModels=0x1E, 0x1F, 0x1A, 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x25, 0x2C, 0x1C, 0x26, 0x27, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x4D, 0x4A, 0x5A, 0x5F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY</td>
<td>R/O</td>
<td>0x3fd</td>
<td>Duration in core C6 states.</td>
<td>Core</td>
<td>Not available to DisplayModels=0x1E, 0x1F, 0x1A, 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x25, 0x2C, 0x1C, 0x26, 0x27, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x4D, 0x4A, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0x4C, 0x5C, 0x5F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA32_APERF</td>
<td>R/O</td>
<td>0xe8</td>
<td>Actual performance clock count.</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA32_MPERF</td>
<td>R/O</td>
<td>0xe7</td>
<td>TSC clock count.</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td>Only on DisplayModels= 0x4E, 0x5E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR_PPERF</td>
<td>R/O</td>
<td>0x64e</td>
<td>Productive performance count.</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR_PKG_ENERGY_STATUS</td>
<td>R/O</td>
<td>0x611</td>
<td>RAPL energy of the package.</td>
<td>Package</td>
<td>Not available to DisplayModels=0x1E, 0x1F, 0x1A, 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x25, 0x2C, 0x1C, 0x26, 0x27, 0x35, 0x36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR_SMI_COUNT</td>
<td>R/O</td>
<td>0x34</td>
<td>System management interrupt count.</td>
<td>Thread</td>
<td>Not available to DisplayModels= 0x1C, 0x26, 0x27, 0x35, 0x36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:

1. A machine readable version of this table can be downloaded from https://download.01.org/perfmon/secure-pmu-access-1.0.csv.
2. The availability and address of some MSRs listed in this table may vary by DisplayFamily_DisplayModel signatures; refer to Chapter 35 of the Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer Manual, Volume 3C (www.intel.com/sdm).
3. Recommended access layer to enforce read-only for better sharing, however allowing write access does not compromise security.